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What Should Be the Farm Credit Policy: 
An Overview or the Problem and Choices Available 
by Dr. Hark A. Edelman 
Agriculture and Public Policy Economist 
South Dakota State University 
Mr. Chairman, it has been my privilege to moderate this workshop on credit 
policy and the family farm and to contribute to the overall understanding of the 
policy choices available for solving the problems currently faced. Farm credit 
pol icy is of interest to all who are concerned about (1) the current farm economic 
conditions, (2) the continuing trends of increased farm size and declining farm 
numbers and, (3) the impacts of these trends on the potential for young people to 
enter farming, the ability of leveraged family farm operators to stay in business, 
and the viability of many rural institutions and communities. 
The credit workshop was a success in that the testimony will assist members of 
the newly formed Senate Small Business Subcommittee on the Family Farm in establish­
ing an initial agenda for action. The testimony presented by the participants in the 
workshop adequately reflects four fundamental concerns: 
1. What is the nature and scope of the current farm credit problems? 
2. What environment led to the current farm conditions? 
3. How much federally subsidized credit should be given and who should receive 
it? 
4. What is the appropriate action for those in financial trouble and what should 
be done to prevent further difficulty? 
This summary is designed to highlight many of the facts and concepts presented 
and to outline the alternatives and consequences for each of the fundamental concerns 
raised during the workshop. I have added additional thoughts for clarification and 
completion of the concepts reviewed. 
The Nature and Scope of the Far• Credit Problem 
The nature and scope of the farm credit problems can be st be under stood by 
examining: (1) who the farm borrowers are and (2) who the farm lenders are. 
Who are the farm borrowers? The concept of what is called a family farm has 
changed dramatically over the years. One family can farm many more acres or care for 
many more animals than 50 years ago as a result of technological advances and the 
public pol icy environment. The food system stereotype of many small pastoral family 
farms--that are independent, self-sufficient and diversified operations in an open 
marketing system--is no longer accurate as a description. The pastoral approach to 
family farming simply does not produce what most farm families consider to be accept­
able income levels. 
In 1982 there were 2. 4 million fa rms using the census definition of $ 1000 in 
amual agricultural sales. This is down from 6.8 million in 1935. Over the years, 
the pastoral family farm has been replaced by a number of large and moderate size 
commercial farms and many types of small farms. These modern farms are no longer 
self-sufficient but use highly technical management processes, are more specialized, 
and are more interdependent with other sectors of the national and international 
economy for farm inputs and food markets. 
Today's farmers are a diverse breed. Dr. Melichar points out that not all have 
the same perceived problems or financial circumstances. Only one fifth are high debt 
operators and one quarter are moderate debt farmers. The remaining 58 percent are 
equity financed. So only a minority are financially at risk (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Far• Financial Position by Sales Class. 1982 
Annual Sales 
Class 
Percent 
of all 
Farms 
$200,000 & over 5 
$40,00-$200,000 24 
less than $40,000 71 
All Farms 100 
Percent 
of 
Agricultural 
Sales 
49 
38 
13 
100 
Percent 
of 
Production 
Expenses 
40 
39 
21 
100 
Percent 
with 
High 
Debt a 
44 
31 
14 
18 
Percent 
with 
Low 
Debtb 
20 
34 
67 
58 
aEnd of Year 1982 farms with a debt/asset ratio greater than 40 percent. 
bEnd of year 1982 farms with a debt/asset ratio less than 10 percent . 
Source: 1. Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector, USDA/ESIFS 1-1, Table 
50, August 1982 . - -- --
2. Emanuel Melichar, "Farm Profits and Financial Distress" 
Workshop on Credit and Tax Policies for the Family Farm, 
Committee on Small Business, U . S . Senate, Apr.  27, 1983 .  
The financial conditions vary by sales class. The largest commercial farms with 
annual gross sales over $200,000 per farm represent less than 5 percent of the farms, 
but account for half of total agricultural sales , 40 percent of input purchases, and 
nearly 40 percent of both farm debt and farm assets. Compared to other sales 
classes, this group has the highest percentage of farmers who are at risk financially 
{44%) and the lowest percentage of equity financed farmers who borrow very little. 
The moderate size farms with annual sales between $40,000 to $200,000 represent 
one quarter of the farms and approximately 40 percent of the sales, production 
expenses, outstanding farm debt and farm assets. In this group, roughly one-third are 
high debt operators, one-third are equity financed farmers and the remaining third 
have moderate debt/asset ratios. 
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The small farms with annual sales less than $40,000 represent 71 percent of all 
farms but account for only 13 percent of sales, and approximately 20 percent of 
production expenses, farm debt and farm assets. This group includes many different 
types. Income data indicate that most of these farmers rely on non-farm income as 
the major source of family income. Age data also indicates that this sales class has 
a higher proportion of retired farm and non farm operators. As a result, the small 
farm sales class has the highest proportion of equity financed farmers (67'.£) and the 
lowest proportion of high debt farmers (14'.£) compared to the other sales classes. 
However, because this sales class is the largest group of farmers, in actual numbers 
over half of the total high debt operators for all classes are small farmers. These 
are l ikely to be young, full and part-time farmers with low resources and low family 
income. 
Who are the far• lenders? At the close of 1982, there was nearly $218 billion 
in outstanding farm debt. This was up $16 billion or 7.9 percent over the end of 
1981. Half of the outstanding debt was in real estate loans and ha lf in operating 
loans. 
The Farm Credit System was the largest lender with nearly a third of the out­
standing farm debt (see Table 2). Individual lenders and banks each represented 
slightly more than one-fifth of the credit. The Farmers Home Administration--which 
is the federal agency lender of last resort-accounted for 11 percent. 
Table 2. U.S. Farm Debt, Outstanding End of Year 1982 
Lending Institution End of Year Debt Change During Year 
bil .dol percent bil.dol. percent 
Farm Credit Systema 68. 1 31.3 2.6 4.0 
Individuals and Others 51.5 23 . 7  .9 1.9 
All Operating Banks 44.8 20.6 3.4 8.3 
Farmers Home Adm. 23.8 11. 0 .6 2.8 
Colllllodity Credit Corp. 16. 6 7.6 8.6 10 7.3 
Life Insurance Cos. 12.8 5.9 -.3 -2.3 
Total 217.7 100. 0  16.0 7.9 
aincludes farm operating and real estate loans made by the Federal Land 
Ba nks, Production Credit Associations and participating Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks. The F arm Credit System institutions are 
borrower-owned cooperative lending agencies that receive no fe deral 
appropriations for lending purposes . 
Source: Agricu ltu ral Finance D ata B ook.  Board of Govern ors , Federal 
Reserve System, Washington, DC, March 1983. 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) and life insurance companies each represent­
ed less than a tenth of the outstanding farm loans. However, the CCC loan volume 
more than doubled during 1982. In addition to CCC credit growth, bank credit also 
increased at a faster pace than the increase in total farm debt during 1982. The life 
insurance companies was the only lender group to reduce the actual dollars loaned in 
farm credit during the year. 
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What Economic Environment Led to Current Conditions? 
After almost two full decades of chronic surpluses and excess production 
capacity, American agriculture in the 1 970's experienced record farm incomes and real 
capital gains (see Tables 3 and 4). Unprecedented growth in demand for agricultural 
exports and cheap credit policies were factors that greatly contributed to the farm 
prosperity in the 1970's. Now at the onslaught of the 1980's, A merican agriculture 
has been experiencing its worst cash flow problems since the Great Depression (see 
Tables 3 and 4). Weak export demand coupled with large grain supplies and tighter 
monetary and credit policies have greatly contributed to the agricultural economic 
environment. Therefore, it is appropriate to analyze market conditions and monetary 
policies more fully to understand what led to current conditions and to determine the 
potential for future change. 
Table 3. U.S. Per Farm Cash Flow and Balance Sheet Statistics, 1960-82�
1 
'fear 
1960 9.4 6.4 3.0 5.6 5.7 43.6 13.0 
120.2 
61 10.1 6.9 3.2 5.7 6.2 45.7 13.6 
123.6 
62 10.9 7.5 3.4 5.7 7.0 49.5 14.2 
119.9 
-"·63 11.6 8.1 3.5 5.8 8.0 53.3 15.1 1
12.5 
64 11.6 8.3 3.3 5.8 9.1 57.2 15.9 
99.1 
65 13.2 9.1 4.1 5.9 10.0 61.2 16.4 
114.0 
66 14.8 10.2 4.6 5.9 11.4 68.0 16.8 
114.2 
67 15.2 10.9 4.3 6.1 12.s 74.1 17 .2 
95.1 
68 16.0 11.6 4.5 6. 1 14.2 80.3 17. 7 
91.5 
69 17.9 12.6 5.3 6.2 15.5 86.6 17 .9 
97.8 
1970 18.9 13.5 5.4 6.6 16.6 92.0 18.1 
89.9 
· 71 20.3 14.6 5.7 6.7 17.4 96.9 17.9 
· 88.4 
7� 23.7 16.4 7.3 6.8 19.2 106.3 18.0 
101.4 
73 33.7 21.1 12.6 7.4 21.5 121.2 17. 7 
141.0 
74 33.5 23.2 10.3 8.0 24.6. 150.1 16.4 
86.0 
75 38.0 26.8 11.2 7.9 30.1 175.5 17.1 
80.8 
76 38,5 29.7 8.8 8.0 33.8 204.3 16.5 
54.0 
77 41.3 32.3 9.0 8.3 38.9 240.1 16.2 
45.2 
_.JI, 48.9 36.0 13.0 8.6 45.7 269.0 
17.0 56.2 
79 58.4 42.4 16.0 9.6 52.3 321.7 1,6.3 
52. l 
1980 57 .4 45.6 11.8 10.3 60.7 372.6 16.3 
30.9 
81 63.3 48.3 15.0 11.6 67.0 403.7 16.6 
32.0 
82 74.5 403.6 18.5 
!iK1.111bers may not add due to rounding. USOA farm definition through 1974, Census
 of Agriculture definition·· 
which 1s Sl,000 in sales or more··applies for 1975 and all following year
s. 
�Includes Interme�iate Product Expenses, Capital Consumption, Business Taxes, Wages to Hired La
bor, and Net 
Rent to all Landlords. 
£11nr.ludes Returns to Operators and Interest Payments . 
.!!.1rnterest Payments divided by Beginning of 'fear Liabilities. 
!!Represents Maximum Debt/Asset Ratio that the residual farm cash flow for the operator and interest would 
service at the average farm interest rate. Break Even Oebt/Asset Ratio• {farm cash flow for operator and 
interest per farm,+farm interest rate)-+ total assest per farm. 
Source: Compiled from USDA, Economic Indicators of the Farm Sector, 1981. 
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Table 4. U.S. Returns to Equity Per Fann, 1960-81 • .!1 
Year 
1960 1.0 0.7 0.3 38.0 2.7 0.2 2.9 61 1.3 2. 1 1.8 39-.5 3.3 4.6 7.9 62 1.5 2. 1 1.5 42.4 3.5 3.6 7.2 63 1.5 2.0 1.3 45.2 3.3 2.9 6.2 64 1.3 2.6 2 .1 48.2 2.7 4.3 7.0 
65 2.2 4.6 3.5 51.2 4.4 6.9 11.3 66 2.6 4. l 2.2 56.6 4.6 4.0 8.6 67 2.0 3.7 1.5 61.4 3.2 2.5 5.8 68 2.0 4.2 1.2 66.1 3.0 1.9 4.9 69 2.6 4.0 -0.2 71.1 3.7 -0.3 3.3 
1970 2.6 3.6 -0.2 75.4 3.5 -0.2 3.3 71 2.7 7.4 4.6 79.5 3.4 5.8 9.3 72 4.5 13.1 9.7 87 .1 5.2 11. 1 16.3 73 10.0 26.0 15.5 99.8 10. 1 15.6 25.6 74 7.0 9.7 -4.1 125.5 5.6 ·3.3 2.3 
75 7. 1 25.7 . 15. 1 145.4 4.9 10.4 15.3 76 4.5 33.0 23.3 170.5 2.6 13.6 16.3 
77 4. l 26.3 12.2 201.2 2.0 6.0 8.1 78 7.2 49.8 27.0 223.3 3.2 12.1 15.3 79 9. 1 47 .1 9.3 269.4 3.4 3.5 6.8 
1980 3.9 32.9 2.5 311.8 1.3 -.8 0.5 81 5.6 -3.8 -29.0 336.7 1. 7 · -8.6 -6.9 
I 
.!'Returns to eo,uity i� fann assets (excluding farm households} from U.S. farm production income and_re�l capital �a,ns, market value basis. USDA farm definition through 1974, Census of Agr1cu,ture def1n1t1on which is $1,000 ,n sales or more applies for 1975 and all following years. 
Source: USDA, Economic Indicators of the F�rm Sector, 1981. 
What led to the rapid export expansion of the 1970's? First, the international 
monetary system shifted from fixed to flexible exchange rates. This immediately 
devalued the dollar by nearly 20 percent relative to other currencies which meant 
that our exports became 20 percent cheaper overnight for our international food 
customers. Second, expansionary monetary policies created easy credit and allowed 
developing countries to borrow to buy food imports. Third, we entered detente with 
the USSR. Fourth, we normalized relations with China. Above all, a world food 
shortage had been developing since the late 1960's. All events set the stage for 
rapid expansion in US exports of grain. 
During the decade (1971-8 1), US producers increased wheat, corn, and soybean 
export volumes an average of 10 percent per year (11.25, 10.6, and 8.1 percent 
respectively). In response to this rapi dly expanding export demand, producers 
expanded production of these crops by 5 percent per year (5.6, 3.8, and 5.6 percent 
respectively). Many producers and analysts expected these trends to continue into 
perpetuity. They haven't. 
In the early 198 0's and before the advent of the Payment in Kind (PIK) program, 
many people perceived the farm problem as low commodity prices. Low commodity prices 
result from ( 1) too much production, (2) too much in reserve, (3) weak domestic 
demand, and (4) weak foreign demand. While the PIK program has recently improved the 
cash flow situation of many farmers, it is a short term program requiring significant 
outlays. High debt operators are still likely to experience serious cash flow 
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problems, and there is still much uncertainty about the future commodity market pro­
spects after PIK's duration. 
In the early 1980's, annual production of wheat, corn and soybeans was more than 
50 percent greater than 10 years earlier (73, 45, and 73 percent respectively). 
Cropland acreage had expanded 20 percent over the decade. Grain reserve carryover 
stocks were surpassing the records established in the early 1960's. 
Domestic demand has been weak due to the recent recession. The length and 
strength of the long awaited recovery is a widely debated topic. Almost no one is 
predicting a strong recovery as long as we contine to fight inflation. 
Export demand is weak due to world-wide recession, a stronger dollar in the 
international money markets, and a rise in foreign competition. Over the past two 
years, the US dollar has appreciated relative to other major currencies by more than 
25 percent. That simply means that exports become more than 25 percent more expen­
sive holding everything else constant. The dollar is likely to remain strong as we 
continue to fight inflation with some success. 
Meanwhile, many food importing countries are in a cash flow bind due to world 
recession and tighter credit. Mexico's food imports, for example, are partially tied 
to credit availability. However, just like American households in a cash flow pinch, 
borrowing more does not necessarily improve the developing country's financial posi­
tion but may tend to dig a deeper financial hole. 
Protectionist trade barriers and export subsidies have received much attention 
as producers in exporting and importing nations fight for world market shares. While 
violations may in fact be substantiated, the prospects for rapid and complete 
acquiescence is not likely. Farmers are well organized in the European Community and 
Japan. US public pressure for "free trade" is often perceived as meddling in the 
internal affairs of our allies. So, export demand is likely to remain weak for as 
long as the world recession continues, particularly if East-West relations become 
colder. After recovery, the analysts predict that it is unrealistic to expect 
export growth rates to mirror the 1970's. Those rates cut in half would be 
optimistic. 
Monetary and credit policies have perhaps more directly contributed to the 
current financial distress in agriculture. As a nation, we have been living beyond 
our means and fueling the fires of inflation since the mid-1960's. We began by 
financing the Vietnam War and the Great Society programs without raising enough tax 
revenues to pay the full bill. The Federal Reserve accommodated by expanding the 
money and credit supply. 
During the 1970's inflation continued to spiral. The baby boom generation--born 
during the 19501s--was entering the labor market. The labor force expanded nearly 25 
percent between 1970 and 1980. OPEC created a world oil shortage that drained 
spending from many domestic sectors to oil imports. This resulted in the classic 
choice between higher unemployment or higher inflation. We simply chose higher 
inflation . 
Who were the gainers and losers under inflationary monetary policies? The 
gainers were borrowers who received lower real interest rates, paid back loans with 
inflated dollars, and watched the value of their leveraged assets appreciate. 
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The losers were savers who watched the buying power of their savings erode. 
Inflation was greater than many interest rates on savings accounts. Particularly 
h urt were those who had fixed value retirement and insurance savings plans. Under 
inflationary policies, the economic incentives for government, private business, and 
consumers are clearly to "buy now" with cheap credit and "pay later." That's what a 
growing number of people did as the inflationary credit expansion of the 1970's 
progressed. 
Since 1979, however, the Federal Reserve in general has been fighting inflation 
with tighter monetary policies. As monetary expansion becomes a declining source of 
funds for credit, interest rates rise to attract more savings as a source of loanable 
funds for credit. However, higher interest rates also ration credit among borrowers. 
Those with flexibility borrow less while others are forced to refinance at higher 
interest rates and develop cash flow problems. 
Under tight monetary policies, the gainers and losers are reversed. Now, the 
savers get ahead and the borrowers must pay a premium interest rate until inflation 
declines and is not expected to reoccur. Hardest hit are those sectors that depend 
on credit, which include high debt borrowers in agriculture and those who depend on 
credit sales in agribusiness, rural communities and international food markets. 
Under non-inflationary policies the economic incentives for private business and 
consumers are to "save now to buy later" or to "pay as you go." 
It remains to be seen whether higher real interest rates and the crowding out 
impacts of government borrowing will be great enough to provide an incentive for 
Congress to lower deficits in the near future. Federal borrowing has increased from 
less than 20 percent of total funds raised in the US financial markets in 1979 to 
about 40 percent last year. Under tight monetary policy, and as Uncle Sam borrows 
more, the amount of funds available to business, consumers and foreign borrowers 
declines. The Congressional Budget Office projects the 1984-88 deficits to be in the 
$ 200 to $250 billion range. A $250 billion deficit would account for nearly half of 
the funds presently raised in the U. S. financial markets. This in turn is likely to 
put upward pressure on interest rates that could stall the recovery unless the 
Federal Reserve accommodates with inflationary expansion once again. 
How Much Subsidized Credit and Who Should Get It? 
The issue of how much credit and who should receive it is related to several 
broader domestic economic policy issues which are explored below. 
How can interest rates be lowered? Dr. Melichar pointed out that the high debt 
farmers will not likely experience significant financial relief unless interest rates 
decline. If the perceived farm credit problem is defined as high interest rates, 
then there are four fundamental options for solving the problem: ( 1) A llow interest 
rates to trail inflation down, (2) Shift to expansionary monetary policy, (3) Lower 
the federal deficit or (4) Raise the farm credit safety net. 
The first option is to rely on relatively tight monetary policy to keep infla­
tion down, with the expectation that interest rates will trail inflation down as the 
uncertainty over its reoccurrence declines. This option relies on credit market 
forces, management skills of the individual farmers, and does not provide for more 
credit subsidies when an economic emergency exists. The probable consequences are 
that interest rates are likely to remain higher in the short run and more high debt 
farmers would go out of business. In some cases these farm enterprises would be 
large enough or numerous enough to affect businesses in rural communities. However, 
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most high debt farmers would survive intact provided that they are able to make the 
transition from high debt to equity farming. 
The second option is to shift from relatively tight monetary policy to 
expansionary policies. Short term interest rates would likely decline until infla­
tion heated up. Long term rates would rise immediately. The probable consequence 
would be another round of inflation and another disinflationary day of recession down 
the ro ad. 
The third option is to alter government fiscal policy. Under relatively tight 
monetary policy, higher deficits place added upward pressure on interest rates. 
Therefore, lower deficits would allow the Federal Reserve and financial markets to 
lower interest rates. As long as spending cuts or tax hikes are targeted away from 
those in a cash flow bind, the net effect would be to improve the financial condition 
of high debt businesses and consumers who are sensitive to higher interest rates. 
The fourth fundamental option is to expand the safety net of federal assistance 
in credit. The consequences of this option depend on the criteria adopted. A safety 
net is like a fishing net, in that something is saved and something falls through the 
cracks in the net. So the success depends on the perspective. This option is 
explored more fully in the following testimony. 
How much £ederally subsidized credit should be given? The Farmers Home Adminis­
tration (FmHA) is the federal lending agency of last resort. It provides grants, 
insured loans, loan guarantees and interest subsidies for qualifying businesses, 
communities, and farm operators who are unable to secure credit elsewhere. Farm 
loans have accounted for about one-third of total FmHA loan volume in recent years. 
FmHA's market share of total farm debt has doubled in the past decade (see Table 
5). While the FmHA share of farm real estate debt has remained relatively constant 
during this period, the FmHA share of the non-real estate farm loans has quadrupled. 
Table 5. Fdrmers Home Administration Farm Debt Statistics, 1971-83. 
,, 0 ,Ota o,a ,. 0 
Real Estate FmHA Total 
Year Farm Debt Farm Debt Farm Debt 
�aol.J (%) 
1971 .8 3.3 2.4 8.0 3.2 5.9 
72 .8 2.8 2.6 8.1 3.4 5.7 
73 .8 2.6 2.8 8.1 3.6 5.6 
74 .9 2.6 3.0 7.6 3.9 5.3 
75 1.0 2.8 3.2 7.2 4.3 5.2 
76 1.8 4.2 3.4 6.8 5. 1 5.6 
77 1.9 3.8 3.7 6.6 5.5 5.3 
78 3.1 5.a 4.0 6.3 7. l 5.8 
79 5.8 8.3 4.1 5.8 9.9 7.0 
1980 9.0 11.2 7.1 8.3 16. 1 9.7 
81 11.8 13 .5 7.7 8.1 19.5 10.7 
82 14.5 15 .:J 8.7 8.3 23.2 11.5 
83 15.0 14.3 8.7 7.9 23.7 11.0 
Source: USOA, A2ricul tural Finance Outlook and Situation, Dec. 1982. 
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This trend raises the fundamental question of whether the level of subsidized 
credit should continue to be increased, should be lowered or should be kept about the 
same. Subsidized credit increases the income potential for those who receive it 
relative to those who don't qualify or do not apply. Eventually, if enough farmers 
receive subsidies in a given locality, part of the benefits would be capitalized 
into farmland values . 
What is the FmHA criteria? To be a Fm HA borrower, one must ( 1) be unable to 
obtain credit elsewhere, (2) be a U.S. citizen, (3) have sufficient training and 
experience, and (4) be or become a not-larger-than-family farm operator. After this 
initial criteria is met, FmHA loan approval is based on additional criteria that 
includes repayment ability, adequate security, soundness of the Farm and Home Plan, 
aoo suitability of the farm. (For a detailed description of FmHA procedures, the 
Center for Rural Affairs has published a very helpful handbook: F mHA Farm Loan 
Handbook .) 
-- -- --
As the lender of last resort, FmHA's security requirements are more flexible 
than those offered by commercial lenders. As a general rule, farm ownership loans 
are secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. On farm operating loans, FmHA will 
have a first lien on production and will require chattel and/or real estate security. 
If security is inadequate, FmHA must consider repayment ability. On emergency loans, 
FmHA will accept real estate or chattel security. Again if security is inadequate 
due to disaster or economic emergency, FmHA considers repayment ability. 
Repayment ability is calculated on the Farm and Home Plan. It is determined by 
comparing an expected cash balance available for debt payment and the schedule of 
planned principle and interest payments. The appraisal of the cash balance for debt 
payment is an estimate of receipts minus expenses and by nature is not entirely an 
objective process. This leaves some room for negotiation . 
If the initial Farm and Home Plan indicates repayment inability, FmHA is 
required to consider alternative plans. In addition, low producing farms 
resulting from lack of development may receive substantially reduced limited resource 
interest rates when there is repayment inability using the regular FmHA rate of 
interest. Mr. Severens testified that by law, "at least 20 percent of FmHA's farm 
ownership and operating loan funds (are to) go to qualifying limited resource 
borrowers." Presently limited resource loan authority has gone unused due to lack of 
limited resource applicants. Mr. Severens suggested possible reasons. One included 
a lack of awareness and knowledge by borrowers in some states that the program 
existed. 
Who should receive subsidized credit? The options include one or a combination 
of the following: (1) no one, (2) young farmers, (3) low resource farmers, (4) 
minority farmers, (5) family farmers, (6) those impacted by acute natural disasters, 
(7) those impacted by chronic adverse weather, (8) those impacted by economic 
emergencies, (9 ) those who are creditworthy, and (10) all who apply. Many of these 
options were highlighted during the workshop. Particularly, Mr. Severens, Dr. 
Melichar and Mr. Blobaum raised debate over the role of Fm HA. Is the agency's role 
to provide "development assistance", "economic emergency assistance" or some 
combination? 
Should those who are not born with a silver spoon receive credit assistance or 
should farming be left to those who were born with the ready-made opportunity to 
farm? Farm structure is influenced by technological advances and the policy 
environment. If the farm credit policy objective is to foster those who initially 
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l ack resources to start  far m ing , then sub si d i zed credit sho uld be ta rgeted to ward 
m inority  a nd yo ung , lo w r e so urce farm ers . 
Ms.  Ler za i nd ic ated that spec ial efforts are  requi r ed to assure that bl ack and 
m i nority  farm er s rec ei v e  dev elopm ental a ssistance.  Mr. Sev eren s  po inted out that 
lo an l i mits  a r e  pro b ab l y  the most effectiv e  tool fo r targeting lo ans to sm al l fam il y  
farms a nd l im i ted r e so urce bo rro w ers. Sever al peo ple entered the d i scussion 
conc erning the a ppro pri a teness  o f  r a i sing the loan l im its i n  the farm cr ed it  bil l 
currentl y  und er d ebate in Co ngress .  Mr ,  Shum an po i nted out  that the  aver age FmHA 
Operating Loan (OL) i s  about $3 0 , 000  whi l e  the OL l im it is $ 1 0 0 , 000 ,  and ther efore 
o nl y  a few bo rro w ers wo u ld li kel y be  affec t ed b y  rai s i ng the l i m it s  on FmHA loan 
programs ( which  hav e b een in effec t for som e  tim e) .  
If the farm cred i t  pol icy obj ec tiv e  i s  to provid e  eco nom ic em ergenc y  rel ie f  for 
the far m er s  who produc e  most o f  the food and for pr iv ate l ending in sti tutions  who 
ho ld mo st o f  the farm d ebt , then the sub sidi zed credit  sho uld be targeted to ward the 
hi gh deb t  c om m ercial  farmer s  who hol d  the l argest por tion o f  priv ate fa rm deb t .  
Ho w ev er , a number o f  the se farm er s financ i ally  l ev erag ed the i r  busine ss  to ex pand 
dur ing the 1 970 's  and ar e no w fi nancially  a t  r isk und er curr ent econo m ic cond itio ns.  
Should the se farm ers be  rewarded with sub sidi zed cr ed i t  since the ir ex pectatio ns 
exceeded their farm pro fi ts and ca pi tal gai n s? 
Mr. Shum an i oo icated that pr e sent pol icy i s  to provide  c r ed i t  to tho se who can  
d ev el o p  a far m  pl an tha t is  abl e to  cash flow  loan  pa yments fro m  annual pro j ec ted 
ca sh bal ances. To a degree , current pol ic y cut s ac ro ss  bo th str uct ur al a nd eco nom i c  
em ergen c y  obj ec tives.  Ho wev er i n  the longer term , farm str uctur e  devel o ps by 
de fault und er th i s  current a ppro ach. 
What is the appropriate action for those in financial di fficulty and what should be 
done to prevent further financial trouble? 
Mr . Shum an i nd ic a ted that the ac tual Fm HA fai l ur e  rate from voluntary 
l i quida tions , foreclo sur e s  a nd b ankruptc ies was 2.9 perc ent o f  270, 000 bo rro wers.  
Mr . Sac i a  comm en ted that 28 perc ent o f  FmHA bor rower s are  d el in quen t .  Mr . Sh um an 
i oo icated that tho s e  requir i ng spec i al a ssistance ac tions were up substan tially  
d ur i ng the fir st six months of  thi s fi scal  year compa r ed to l ast . 
Mr.  Wai t s  i n::i icated tha t in 1 982 the del inquent lo ans were 3.2 perc en t for the 
F eder al Land Banks and 3 , 3  perc ent for the Prod uctio n  Cr ed it Assoc i a tions  and about 4 
perce nt for comm erc i al b ank  farm lo ans. The F arm Credit  Sys tem for eclo sur e  a uc t ions 
in 1 982 were 385 (less than 1 tenth o f  one  percent) for the Fed er al Land Banks a nd 
870 ( less  than 3 tenths o f  one perc ent) for the PCA's.  Mr.  Wai ts al so i nd icat ed that 
the 1 982 rate s were up ov er 1 98 1 .  With these sta t i stics  in m ind , m an y  peo pl e hav e 
becom e concerned abo ut a pp ro priate  r em ed ie s  and prev ention o f  further di fficulty.  
What are the appropriate remedies? FmHA remed ie s fo r tho se borro wer s who ar e 
d el in quent a nd/or i n  defaul t i ncl ud e  loan  con sol idat ion , resched ul i ng , de ferr al , 
volun tary l i quidation and fo r eclosur e.  
Consol idatio n occurs whe n a new  loan is  a ppro v ed whi l e  ano ther loan exists .  The 
term s o f  a con sol idated loan are set accordi ng to repa ym ent  ab ili ty. Ini ti al 
pa ym ents m ay be d el ayed and l oan s m ay be  co nsol idated even i f  the bo rrower i s  
d el inquent o n  the c urr ent loan . 
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Rescheduling spreads out the principle and interest payments over a longer period 
to reduce the size of a borrower's individual payments. Rescheduling is used if a 
borrower is delinquent, does not need a new loan , but does have a cash flow pro blem 
with the size of  current payments. Depending on the circumstances , however , 
rescheduling a loan may carry either a higher or lower interest rate . 
Deferral allows postponement of principle and interest for up to three payments . 
It does not cancel interest o r  principle. To receive a deferral , a farmer must prove 
ability to make up the deferred payments and continue normal loan repayment after the 
deferral period is over . 
"Voluntary" liquidation occurs when the FmHA county committee and supervisor ask 
the borrower to arrange to sell or transfer security property to cover Fm HA debt. 
This occurs after default and when Fm HA determines that 11further servicing cannot be 
justified" and "additional servicing no longer helps accomplish the lo an o bjectives" . 
If the farm bo rrower does not volunteer to liquidate , the county supervisor 
recommends foreclosure for the approval of the state director. Foreclosure o ccurs if 
a net recovery of debt can be made o r  if failing to foreclose would hurt the program 
in the area. Acceleration occurs under foreclosure and means that the entire loan 
must be paid back within a specified period. FmHA also has the authority to file 
civil suit against the borrower and/or file claims in bankruptcy court to recover 
m oney owed. 
Several alternative remedy proposals were raised in the workshop. Moratoriums 
were discussed by Mr. Sacia, Mr. Blobaum and Mr. Shuman. A moratorium implies an 
alternative FmHA policy for loan deferrals and rescheduling of payments. Presumably 
this is designed to partially forgive: (1 ) interest on any deferred interest and 
principle, (2) interest on the principle, or ( 3 )  part of  the principle. The 
resulting increase in Fm HA appropriations required would depend upon the nature and 
extent o f  such m oratoriums. Mr. Waits pointed out , that if a m oratorium were to be 
expanded to the cooperatively owned farm credit system , higher interest rates would 
result for the remaining farm credit system borrowers , and this would also further 
reduce the number of farm credit systems lenders . 
Mr. Blobaum suggested that under present policy , FmHA may have so m e  
incentive to m ove against delinquent borrowers i n  o rder to receive preference status 
when a petition of  bankruptcy is ultimately filed. Current bankruptcy law allows the 
trustee certain avoidance powers , and under certain conditions FmHA is able to avoid 
these pro visions if its agency representatives m ove during the limited preference 
period, Mr. Blobaum suggested lengthening the preference period to remove the 
incentive . This may , however , lengthen the bankruptcy process . 
What should be done to prevent further financial trouble? The issue of financial 
counseling services for pro blem bo rrowers was raised several times during the 
workshop. The potential alternatives include (1 ) voluntary financial counseling 
pro vided by FmHA , ( 2) FmHA approval of the borrower's farm and financial decisions , 
and ( 3 )  non-FmHA financial counseling services . 
Voluntary financial counseling could be expanded in FmHA offices. Mr. Patnoe 
indicated that more farm visits would be an approach. Mr. Severens indicated that 
default rates vary widely for FmHA county offices in the same area, implying that m ore 
training in financial counseling may lower defaults in some areas. Mr. Shuman 
indicated that additional counseling services requires m ore staff and training 
dollars , which he has asked for but not received . 
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FmHA approval of the borrower's fa rm and fi nancial decisions is the second option. 
Mr. Patnoe i ndicated that, historically, FmHA counter-signed checks and implied that 
loan super visors would have to have mor e  experience in farm pro duction and 
marketing for this approach to work . 
Non-FmHA financial management assistance is available from the Cooperative 
Extension Service a nd  private consultants. In addition, volunteer farmers with the 
" right expe rience" might be availabl e to provid e counseling to young farmer s  during 
tough times. Finally, the issue of ad equate farmer input into FmHA d ecisions was 
raised during the workshop. Perhaps additional farmer input would be us eful in 
determining the best solution to the financial counsel ing probl em. 
CONCLUDING COMMENT 
In summary, the Farm Cr edit Pol icy workshop highlighted a cross section of 
perceptions, facts, and recommendations. The outcome was a better und erstanding of 
(1 ) the natur e a nd  scope of the farm credit situation, (2) the policy environment 
that l ed to curr ent conditions, and (3)  the curr ent probl ems and choices available. 
As a result, the testimony should prove useful to the members of the Senate Committee 
on Small Business and others who are interested in farm cr edit policy as these issues 
are debated in the future. 
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